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19671 CASE NOTES
recognizing the simple fact that the status of man has as much to do with
the dignity he can command in his own home as his living conditions.64
Seymour Mansfield
64 As Professor Thomas Emerson observes: "[PIrotection, in other words, of the dignity
and integrity of the individual-has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age-industrialization, urbanization,
and organization-operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into
it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." As quoted in the
Brief for Appellant at 20, See v. Seattle, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967), from Emerson. Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIMITATIONS ON
PERMISSIVE EAVESDROPPING STATUTES
Checking complaints that ten thousand dollar bribes were the sine qua non
for obtaining New York State liquor licenses, New York County Rackets
Bureau investigators' uncovered what appeared to be widespread corruption
in the state Liquor Authority. Acting under New York's permissive eavesdrop
statute,2 two assistant district attorneys obtained a court order for installa-
tion of a surreptitious recording device in the private law office of a former
Liquor Authority employee. Leads obtained from this eavesdrop resulted in
a second application for permission to eavesdrop, this time in the business
office of one Harry Steinman, a prospective liquor license applicant. The
order, issued by a New York Supreme Court justice, authorized recording
of "any and all conversations, communications and discussions" in Steinman's
business office for a period of two months. Within two weeks, via the eaves-
drop, a conspiracy was uncovered involving issuance of a liquor license for
I A branch of the District Attorney's Office of New York County.
2N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 813-a (1958). "Ex parte order for eavesdropping. An
ex parte order for eavesdropping . . .may be issued by any justice of the supreme
court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions ...upon oath or
affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of an officer above the
rank of sergeant of any police department . . . that there is reasonable ground to
believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the
person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be over-
heard or recorded and the purpose thereof . . . . In connection with the issuance of
such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and any other
witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable grounds
for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective . . .not for a
period of more than two months unless extended or renewed by the justice or judge
who signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that such extension
or renewal is in the public interest ... .
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the New York Playboy Club. Ralph Berger was convicted on two counts of
conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority.
Tape recordings of relevant portions of the eavesdropped conversations had
been received at trial, over objection. The appellate division affirmed without
opinion, as did the court of appeals by a divided vote.3 In a landmark
decision, 4 the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
struck down New York's statute as permitting trespassory invasion of a
constitutionally protected area by general warrant, contrary to the command
of the fourth amendment. Berger v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967).
No less than six opinions5 were filed by the nine Supreme Court justices.
The majority proceeded solely on fourth amendment grounds rejecting or
refusing to consider the following proposed alternatives: that the statute
authorizes a search for "mere evidence"; 6 that it invades the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; 7 and that it offends under
the ninth amendment.8 This note will attempt to give a brief background
of the judicial and legislative history of electronic eavesdropping, elucidate
the Berger holding, and explore the broad implications it creates for future
court and congressional action.
Electronic eavesdropping (commonly known as "bugging" and so denomi-
nated throughout the Berger opinions), is to be distinguished from wire-
tapping, which is confined to the interception of telegraphic and telephonic
communications. The first wiretap case to reach the United States Supreme
Court was Olmstead v. United States.9 The interception therein of Olmstead's
telephone line was accomplished without entry upon his premises and the
Court found no violation of the fourth amendment,' refusing to extend its
3 People v. Berger, 18 N.Y.2d 638, 219 N.E.2d 295 (1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 967
(1966).
4 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3361 (1967): "The fate of electronic eavesdropping in private homes
and offices decried as an invasion of privacy so grave as to be beyond a magistrate's
power to authorize and defended as a mere sophisticated, technical advance in the
techniques of search and seizure-was placed in the hands of the Supreme Court last
week." Amicus curiae briefs for affirmance were filed by Massachusetts and Oregon
and by the National District Attorney's Association; for reversal, by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases
and the New York Civil Liberties Union.
5 Berger v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967). Justice Clark for the Court; Justice
Douglas concurring separately; Justice Stewart concurring in the result but insisting
on the constitutionality of the New York statute; Justice White dissenting; Justice
Harlan dissenting; Justice Black dissenting.
6 Id. at 1876.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
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enumeration of "persons, houses, papers and effects" to encompass conversa-
tions. However, Congress then passed the Federal Communications Act, a
section of which prohibited interception of communications by wire or radio
and divulging or publishing their contents." The Nardone cases 12 extended
the exclusionary rule to wiretap evidence offered in federal prosecutions and
Benanti v. United States 3 barred federal use of wiretap evidence even when
obtained by state officers acting under authority of state law. Schwartz v.
Texas14 held that the federal statute does not bar wiretap evidence in state
courts. Thirty-six states prohibit wiretapping but twenty-seven of these permit
"authorized" interception of some type. 15
Electronic eavesdropping, as opposed to wiretapping, is permitted both
governmentally and privately in all but seven states, and in six of even these
seven it is permitted on official order.16 Dissenting in Olmstead,1 T Mr. Justice
Brandeis foretold the future with clarity: "The progress of science in furnish-
ing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-
tapping."' 8 Thirty-five years later, dissenting in Lopez v. United States,'9
Mr. Justice Brennan examined the fantastic scientific advances in eavesdrop
technique and concluded: "Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police
omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of
tyranny." 20 The Berger Court discusses at length the almost unbelievable
capabilities of modern electronics in penetrating anywhere and everywhere
and reflects the culmination of growing judicial and legislative concern with
uncontrolled electronic eavesdropping.
21
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
1147 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
12302 U.S. 379 (1937), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
13 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
14 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
15 See Berger v. New York, supra note 5, at 1878 n.5.
16 The six states prohibiting surreptitious eavesdropping by mechanical or electronic
device but permitting it if officially authorized are: California, CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h-j
(Supp. 1966) ; Maryland, MD. ArN. CODE, art. 27, § 125A (1957) ; Massachusetts, MAss.
ANN~. LAWS, ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1964); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.660, 200.670
(1963); New York, N.Y. PEN. LAW § 738 (1957); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.540
(1) (c) (Supp. 1963). Illinois prohibits it even on official order, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 14.1-.7 (1963).
17 Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
18 Id. at 474.
19373 U.S. 427 (1963).
20 Id. at 466.
21 E.g., Hearings on S. 234 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1958).
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Parabolic microphones, which concentrate sound much as curved mirrors
focus light, can pick up conversations three hundred feet distant and make
wireless eavesdropping from building to building across a city street quite
simple. 22 Microphones the size of a sugar cube are presently available at less
than ten dollars each.23 If access can be had to a subject's clothing (for
example, through his dry cleaner or a public check-room) he can be made
into a walking transmitter in minutes. One button of his suit-coat can
conceal a subminiature transmitter, the second button a tiny microphone,
and the third a battery source, with conductive wire matched to the thread as
the antenna.24 A distinguished law professor has pointed out: "Nowhere...
is one quite safe from the eavesdropper. Not in one's home or office or auto-
mobile. Not even in one's bathroom with the shower turned on ' 125 (The
frequency discrimination of new microphones can separate the audio fre-
quencies of running water from the lower frequencies of the human voice.)
Three primary approaches have been taken to legislative control of official
electronic eavesdropping: absolute prohibition, limited permission, complete
permission. 26 Proponents of absolute prohibition stress the extreme threat
electronic eavesdropping poses to individual liberties.2 7 Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, denominated it "dirty business"2' 8
and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in On Lee v. United States,29 asserted:
"Such 'dirty business'.. . makes for lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts
a premium on force and fraud, not on imagination and enterprise. °3 0 Pro-
ponents of limited permission, while admitting electronic eavesdropping's
threat to the individual, stress the dangers of organized crime and the im-
22 DASH, SCHWARTZ, & KNOWLTON, THE EAVEsDROPPERS 350 (1959).
23 Mosler Research Prods., Inc., Danbury, Conn., Catalogue.
24Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's,
66 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1003, 1006 (1966).
25 Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MrNN.
L. REv. 891, 892 (1960).
26 See generally comment, Electronic Eavesdropping: Can It Be Authorized?, 59
Nw. U.L. REV. 632, 633-34 (1964).
27 See generally Berger v. New York, supra note 5, concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas; Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 855, 856 (1960); BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN 174
(1952): "A great deal could be learned about crime by putting recording devices in
confessionals and in physician's consulting rooms, by compelling wives to testify against
their husbands, by encouraging children to report the dangerous thoughts uttered by
their parents. The trouble with these techniques, whatever their utility in safeguarding
national security, is that a nation which countenances them ceases to be free."
28 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928), Justice Holmes referred specifically only to wiretapping.
29343 U.S. 747 (1952).
30 Id. at 761.
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portance of national security and would permit electronic eavesdropping
only if limited to official investigations in these two areas.3 1 Proponents of
complete permission stress the extreme effectiveness of electronic eavesdrop-
ping and would permit its use in any area of legitimate official concern.32
Turning from the legislative background of the Berger decision to the
judicial background, the case is seen to represent an extension of the core
right of privacy of the fourth amendment.3 3 This right was recognized in
early English law and developed further in response to abuses pre-dating
the American Revolution. In the famous case of Entick v. Carrington,34
Lord Camden held intrusions into individual privacy subversive of all the
comforts of society and that general search warrants were unlawful because
uncertain. Use of the general warrant has been regarded as the single im-
mediate cause of the American Revolution.33 The Founders were reacting
to such abuses when the fourth amendment was embodied in the Bill of
Rights.
Mr. Justice Bradley, in Boyd v. United States,36 commented on Lord
Camden's holding in Entick:
The principles laid down . . . affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security. . . . They apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that con-
31 See generally Berger v. New York, supra note 5, dissenting opinions of Justice
White and Justice Black; THE CHALLENGE OF CR E IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
at 200-03 (1967); Kilzer, A Federal Wiretap Law-Needed Weapon Against Organized
Crime, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 98, at 101 (1963): "The most powerful and versatile single
countermeasure readily available for a terminal struggle with syndicated crime is
legalized wiretapping." Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
But see Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44
MINN. L. REV. 813, 833 (1960).
32 E.g., Berger v. New York, supra note 5, at 1891, Justice Black (dissenting): "In
both perception and retention a machine is more accurate than a human listener . . .
it repeats the very words uttered. . . . Transcribed eavesdropping evidence is far more
likely to lead a judge or jury to reach a correct judgment or verdict-the basic and
always-present objective of a trial." But see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3,
at 509-10 (1959) at which Samuel Dash (an author of THE EAVESDROPPERS, supra
note 22), recounted how technicians on his staff were able to edit tapes successfully,
thereby completely distorting the meaning of the statements originally recorded. He
added that the editings, once transferred to new tapes, defied detection either by ear
or by oscillograph.
S3 Supra note 10.
34 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
35 10 ADas, WORKS 247 (1826).
36 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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stitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property. . . .37
Again, in Wolf v. Colorado38 it was said: "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society." 39
There are two clauses to the fourth amendment. Mr. Justice Butler made
the following analysis of them in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States.40
The first (reasonableness clause) forbids every search that is unreasonable. 41
"There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case
is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. '42 The second (warrants
clause) prevents issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact.48
"[It] emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches. Since
before the creation of our government, such searches have been deemed
obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty." 44 Evidence obtained in
violation of fourth amendment commands has been excluded in federal courts
since 1914,4 5 and since 1961, in state courts as well. 46
Blocking the application of the fourth amendment to electronic eaves-
dropping evidence was the Olmstead case47 which held verbal (intangible)
evidence to be outside the fourth amendment and hence not subject to its
warrants clause requirements nor to the federal exclusionary rules. Rather
than hurdle the obstacle of Olmstead, the Supreme Court (until Berger)
has chosen to side step it by developing two case-lines in both of which they
limit the Olmstead result without overruling it.48 These case-lines may be
37 Id. at 630.
38338 U.S. 25 (1949).
391d. at 27.
40282 U.S. 344, 356-57 (1931).
41 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
42 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
431. . . no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44 Supra note 42.
45 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
46 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47 Supra note 17.
48 These cases refer to electronic eavesdropping. Such "evasive action" was not
necessary to control wiretapping because of the advent of the Federal Communications
Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
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summarized as the "consenting party" series and the "physical trespass"
series.
In the consenting party cases, evidence secured by a mechanical or elec-
tronic eavesdropping device has been generally held admissible, regardless of
other factors present, where one of the parties to the eavesdropped con-
versation has consented to or cooperated in its interception. 9 Illinois refused
to follow the federal "any party consent" rule of admissibility and imposed
an "all party consent" requirement. 50 The Illinois Supreme Court, citing
Illinois' complete statutory prohibition, 51 reasoned that only an "all party"
rule would accord with the clearly expressed legislative intent to eliminate sur-
reptitious electronic eavesdropping.5 2 The Berger case5 3 does not purport
to overrule the consenting party holdings54 exempting electronic eavesdropping
from fourth amendment requirements where any party has consented,55
but its thrust, to rigidly control all such activities within fourth amendment
standards, portends favorably for the Illinois position in future federal
holdings.
With regard to physical trespass, the first "bugging" case to reach the Su-
preme Court was Goldman v. United States.56 The Court held that use of a
detectaphone placed against an office wall but not penetrating it in any
manner, to hear private conversations in the adjoining office, did not violate
the fourth amendment because there was no physical trespass in connection
with the interception. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Frankfurter and
Murphy registered strong dissents, all insisting that the detectaphone consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and seizure within the prohibition of the fourth
amendment. In Silverman v. United States,57 District of Columbia police used
a "spike mike," which consisted of a microphone attached to a foot-long
49 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952). Cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), where use of an exten-
sion telephone by police to overhear a conversation with the consent of the subscriber
who was also a party to the conversation was held not to be an "interception" as
proscribed by § 605, Federal Communications Act, supra note 48.
50 People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966).
5 1 Supra note 16.
52 Supra note 50.
53 Supra note 5.
54 Supra note 49.
55 On a strict reading of Olmstead, supra note 17, conversations, as intangibles, are
exempt from fourth amendment requirements anyway. But the Supreme Court, perhaps
mindful of the powerful Olmstead dissents, has seemed to prefer the "consenting party"
rationale where available.
56316 U.S. 129 (1942).
57365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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spike, inserted into a party wall until it made contact with a heating duct in
Silverman's house turning the entire heating system into a giant sound
conductor. The Court excluded the eavesdrop evidence on grounds -that its
procurement involved an unauthorized physical penetration into the prem-
ises. 68 "Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is
beyond the pale of even those decisions in which a closely divided court has
held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic means did not
amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights." 59 A later case, Cullins
v. Wainwright,60 applied Silverman broadly in excluding evidence obtained
by lowering a microphone down an air-shaft of a multiple apartment building
until it was opposite a grill in petitioner's apartment.
That portion of the shaft between the floor and ceiling . . .is wholly within the
apartment and, we think, a part of it. . . .The lowering of a microphone into
that portion of the ventilating shaft was an invasion of a constitutionally pro-
tected area and violated the Fourth Amendment rights of those in the apartment
whose conversations were overheard by means of electronic eavesdropping. 61
The Berger case,6 2 while bringing eavesdrop evidence within the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment generally,6 may not obviate the physical
trespass requirement. As Justice Black (dissenting) points out:
581d. at 513, Justice Douglas (concurring): "The concept of 'an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises' . . . is beside the point. . . .The wrong (was)
done when the intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded or revealed .... The depth
of the penetration of the electronic device-even the degree of its remoteness from the
inside of the house-is not the measure of the injury."
59 Silverman v. United States, 363 U.S. 505, 509-10. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963): "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial
physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful
invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States that the Fourth
Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against
the more traditional seizure of papers and effects."
60328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
61 Id. at 482-83. Pregnant with implications for the future, when read with Berger, is
United States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Tex. 1964), in which "bugging" of
a public telephone booth was held to violate the fourth amendment: "A person using a
public telephone in an enclosed booth and having placed the money in the coin box has
the same right to its use as a customer in a taxi or a guest in an apartment .... Today
electronic devices without physical presence enable an intrusion upon the air, light and
sound waves of a person's property as real as any physical trespass . . . .In the light
of technological improvements it is clear that an electronic device placed in a protected
area by government agents without the knowledge of the defendant and transmitting a
telephone conversation of defendant is as much a physical trespass and violation of the
right to privacy as is the making of an unlawful physical entry, and overhearing the
conversation under such circumstances is a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Contra,
United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
62 Supra note 5.
63 Berger v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 1886, Justice Douglas (concurring): "I join the
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This case [Berger] deals only with a [physically] trespassory eavesdrop, an
eavesdrop accomplished by placing a 'bugging' device in petitioner's office. Sig-
nificantly, the court does not purport to disturb the Olmstead-Silverman--Gold-
man distinction between eavesdrops which are accompanied by a physical inva-
sion and those that are not . ... 64
Contrary to Justice Black however, because Berger did involve physical
entry, the fact that the Court went beyond and totally struck New York's
permissive eavesdrop statute65 as offensive-even though the statute also
included eavesdrops involving no physical trespass 6 -- indicates that the
physical trespass requirement is a rapidly dying, if not dead, doctrine. Sup-
porting this is the Berger Court's own characterization of the Silverman
holding: "The [Silverman] decision did not turn upon the technicality of a
trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." 67 The
tenor of Berger is that electronic eavesdropping, no matter how accomplished,
is inherently trespassory. Language like: "Few threats to liberty exist which
are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices," 68 presages
a "preferred position" for the privacy of speech akin to that given freedom
of speech in first amendment cases.
The New York permissive eavesdrop statute has been termed "an excellent
vehicle for analysis of the possibility of placing eavesdropping within the
prescriptions as well as proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment." 69 The
Berger Court made just such an analysis and found the statute sorely lacking
in almost every regard. There are two categories into which the Court's
criticisms fall: defects in the particular provisions of this particular statute,
and, more importantly, defects in any permissive eavesdrop statute because
they are inherent in permissive eavesdropping itself. To a considerable ex-
tent, the categories overlap.
The Berger Court concedes that the New York statute satisfies the fourth
opinion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United
States .... and its offspring and brings wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping
fully within the purview of the Fourth Amendment"; Berger, id. at 1895, Justice Black
(dissenting): "In failing to make clear that the New York statute is invalid only as applied
to certain kinds of eavesdropping, the Court's opinion leaves the definite impression that
all eavesdropping is governed by the Fourth Amendment."
64 Id. at 1895.
65 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (1958).
6 6 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 738 (1957).
67 Supra note 63, at 1880.
68 Supra note 63, at 1885.
69 Supra note 26, at 638.
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amendment's requirement that a neutral and detached authority be inter-
posed between police and public,70 and assumes, without conceding, that its
"reasonable ground" provision 7 1 is equivalent to the "probable cause" re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. It goes on to conclude that the statute
is "deficient on its face in other respects, ' 72 gives "broadside authorization,"
and is equally as offensive as the odious "general warrant. '73
Observing that, "By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion
on privacy that is broad in scope," the Berger Court finds an especially
great need for "particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing
required when judicial authorization . .. is sought. '7 4 New York's statute
is scored for authorizing eavesdropping without requiring belief that any
particular offense has been or is being committed, nor that the conversa-
tions sought be particularly described. "[F]ailure to describe with par-
ticularity the conversations sought gives the officer a roving commission to
seize any and all conversations. ' 75 The statute's requirement that the persons
whose communications are to be eavesdropped be named76 is dismissed as
doing no more than identifying the person whose constitutionally protected
area is to be invaded, rather than "particularly describing" the communica-
tions, conversations, or discussions to be seized. As with general warrants, this
broad discretion is too dangerous in the hands of the officer executing the
order.7
7
The Court found the statute's two-month eavesdropping authorization to
be "the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches and seizures pursuant to
a single showing of probable cause." It avoids prompt execution and "[d] uring
such a long and continuous period [24 hours a day] the conversations of
any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device will be
seized indiscriminately and without regard to their connection to the crime
70 Supra note 63, at 1881.
71 Supra note 65.
7 2 Supra note 63, at 1882.
7 3 Supra note 63, at 1883.
74 Supra note 63, at 1882.
75 Supra note 63, at 1883; but see Justice Harlan's dissent at 1903-04, where he states
that mere listening is not a seizure---"some use of the conversation beyond the initial
listening process is required for the seizure of the spoken word," and that "materials to
be seized are described with sufficient particularity if the warrant readily permits their
identification . . . .The affidavits make plain that, among the intercepted conversations,
the police were authorized to seize only those 'relative to the payment of unlawful fees
to obtain liquor licenses. . . .' There could be no difficulty, either in the course of the
search or in any subsequent judicial proceeding, in determining whether specific conver-
sations were among those authorized for seizure ..
7 6 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (1958).
7 7 Supra note 63, at 1883.
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under investigation." The statute places no termination date on the eaves-
drop once the conversation sought is seized. Also repugnant to the fourth
amendment, the Court held, is the statute's provision for extensions of the
initial two-month period (presumedly for two months each) on a mere show-
ing that such extension is "in the public interest."7 8 The statute has no
requirement for notice ("necessarily because its success depends on secrecy")
as do conventional warrants. The statute does not overcome this defect by
requiring some showing of special facts. "On the contrary, it permits uncon-
sented entry without any showing of exigent circumstances." The statute
provides for no return on the warrant, thus leaving the officer full discretion
as to use of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties. "In
short, the statute's blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is without
adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures. '79
Mr. Justice Clark, for the Berger majority, denies the impossibility of
drawing a warrant or a statute authorizing eavesdropping and yet meeting
fourth amendment requirements and cites Osborn v. United States.80 The
eavesdrop order in Osborn, which was upheld, is distinguished by Justice
Clark because the authorization was "under the most precise and discriminate
circumstances . . . which fully met the requirement of particularity of the
Fourth Amendment."'' l The Osborn order, Justice Clark finds, was based
upon a detailed factual affidavit alleging commission of a specific criminal
offense directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice; it
described the types of conversation sought with particularity; it provided
that the officer could not search unauthorized areas; once the property sought
was found, the officer could not use the order as a passkey to further search;
the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than a series or a continuous
surveillance; the order was executed with dispatch; the officer was required
to make a return on the order; generally, no greater invasion of privacy
was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.8 2 New York's
statute on the contrary, Justice Clark held, "lays down no such 'precise and
discriminate' requirements. Indeed, it authorizes the 'indiscriminate use' of
electronic devices as specifically condemned in Osborn.
' 8 3
78Supra note 63, at 1883-84. Cf. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932), in which
a National Prohibition statutory search warrant was good for ten days and the court
held that new probable cause must be shown, after expiration of the first warrant, before
a new warrant could issue.
79 Supra note 63, at 1884.
80 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Two federal judges jointly authorized "bugging" the person
of a prospective witness (with his knowledge and cooperation) to record conversations
with a defendant's attorney concerning bribing of jurors. (It seems Osborn could be
sustained on pure consenting party grounds, supra note 49.)
81 Supra note 63, at 1882.
82Supra note 63, at 1882-83.
83 Supra note 63, at 1883.
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Taking sharp issue with Justice Clark's portrayal of what permissible
permissive eavesdropping must encompass, the Berger dissenters found the
majority's standards deliberately designed to make permissive eavesdropping
impossible. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, charged: "The Court appears in-
tent upon creating out of whole cloth new constitutionally mandated proce-
dures carefully tailored to make eavesdrop warrants unobtainable."'84 Justice
Black, likewise dissenting in Berger, was more specific: "Since secrecy is an
essential, indeed a definitional, element of eavesdropping, when the Court
says there shall be no eavesdropping without notice, the Court means to
inform the Nation there shall be no eavesdropping period."'85
The key question is where does Berger really leave the future of permissive
eavesdrop legislation? One commentator, before Berger, analyzed New York's
statute and predicted it would need only two modifications to be found
constitutional: limit its eavesdrop authorization to business premises and
require notice of the interception within six months to all parties involved.8 6
As has been seen, the Berger Court held New York's statute to need many
more modifications than two. Judge Sobel, in People v. Grossman," stated
that electronic eavesdropping is necessarily indiscriminate because, techno-
logically, no electronic device has been discovered which shuts itself off to
all social discourse and turns itself on when the conversation turns to
criminal ends; in consequence of which, advance specificity of description
of the verbal statements to be seized is impossible and any eavesdrop order
is therefore unconstitutional. Judge Sobel was not upheld in this contention
but his concern is clearly echoed in Berger.
Certainly, the future of permissive eavesdropping will involve staggering
conflicts between dual opposing pressures: (1) increased clamor for official
eavesdropping authorization as organized crime proliferates and threats to
national security intensify in this nuclear age; (2) increased demand for
total prohibition or tight control of both official and private eavesdropping
88
as the fantastic scientific advances predicted by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
1928 pose the ultimate threat to individual rights.8 9
The gist of Berger v. New York seems to be to bring all officially obtained
84Supra note 63, at 1911.
85 Supra note 63, at 1897.
88 Supra note 26, at 640.
8745 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1966), reversed, 27 App. Div. 2d 572, 276
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1966).
88 Another fruitful source for future constitutional controversy will be the growing
sophistication of visual electronic surveillance by such means as miniaturized closed-
circuit television cameras or high-powered telescopes coupled to video-recorders.
890 lmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928), Justice Brandeis (dissenting):
"Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
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electronic eavesdrop evidence within the purview of the fourth amendment,
physical trespass or no, so that it must satisfy rigidly applied fourth amend-
ment standards as to its origin or be excluded at both federal and state
trials. Further, permissive eavesdrop legislation seems now to face virtual
"presumptive invalidity" so that the burden is upon the legislature, propound-
ing it to embody full fourth amendment safeguards, Justice Black's Berger
dissent notwithstanding: "From the deficiencies the Court finds in the New
York statute, it seems -that the Court would be compelled to strike down a
state statute which merely tracked verbatim the language of the Fourth
Amendment itself." 90
William Hurst
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions."
9
oSupra note 63, at 1897. But cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), Justice
Clark: "The states are not . . . precluded from developing workable rules governing
arrests, searches and seizures to meet the practical demands of effective criminal investi-
gation and law enforcement in the states, provided that those rules do not violate the
-constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant
command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to
complain."
TORTS-DEFAMATION AND THE PRIVILEGED SPEECH
HIERARCHY-HOW LOW CAN YOU GO
The president of Queens College, acting under the authorization and ap-
proval of the chairman of the New York City Board of Higher Education,
issued a public statement in answer to charges of anti-Catholic discrimina-
tion in the promotional policies of the College. The statement was intended
and understood to refer to the plaintiffs, two associate professors at Queens
College. In a libel action brought by these professors alleging that they were
defamed by the statement, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
appellate division of the supreme court and held that the public expression
of the position of the Board was an appropriate exercise of discretion and was
absolutely privileged. Consequently, any teachers allegedly defamed by the
public statement were not entitled to recover. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d
394, 222 N.E.2d 721 (1966).
The significance of the decision lies in the extension of the doctrine of
absolute privilege to defame to members of a public school board. Although
a number of courts have granted such an official a qualified privilege,' never,
in the absence of a statute, has a court given a school board member absolute
1 Branaman v. Hinkle, 137 Ind. 496, 37 N.E. 546 (1894) ; Ebaught v. Miller, 127 Kan.
464, 274 P. 251 (1929) ; Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910) ; Hett v.
Ploetz, 20 Wis. 2d 55, 121 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
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